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Book Review
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION, by Donald R. Songer 1
DAVED MUTTART 2
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION (Transformation) provides two new and important additions to
our knowledge of the Supreme Court of Canada. First, the book describes ex-
tensive interviews conducted with the justices of the Supreme Court by the au-
thor. Second, the work explores the extent to which the Court's decision
making is legally and judicially based, as opposed to being policy or politically
based. Transformation's claim to be an empirical examination rests upon analyses
of the interviews, as well as reliance on statistical data.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in particular, has several characteristics
that make it an excellent example for, and analysis of, high courts around the
world. Unlike its American counterpart, which has a constitutionally limited
jurisdiction, it has a plenary jurisdiction. Canada's Court has had at least two
female justices serving on the bench since 1987, and it currently has four female
members. The highest courts in other Anglo-American jurisdictions have only
ever had one woman serving the bench at any given time.3 Further, the Supreme
Court of Canada displays many tendencies in its rulings, which judicially situates
it midway between the United States Supreme Court and the House of Lords
in the United Kingdom. For example, the Canadian Court has demonstrated
more of a willingness than the House of Lords to overturn its own prior deci-
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) 290 pages.
2. Ph.D., Sessional Instructor, Faculty of Criminology, Justice and Policy Studies, University of
Ontario Institute of Technology.
3. Daved M. Muttart, "A Content Analysis of Supreme Court of Canada Judgements:
Preliminary Observations" (SSRN Working Paper Series, September 2009), online: <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1470703>.
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sions, but it is typically less willing to do so than the US Supreme Court. Addi-
tionally, as with other courts, its proper role within the legal system is constantly
debated.
As an American, and thus an "outsider" to Canadian law, Donald Songer
avoids doctrinal issues, and instead concentrates on comparing quantitative data
from several judicial eras. In most instances, Songer compares and contrasts the
Court's behaviour in five time periods: 1970-1975, before it obtained control of
its docket; 1976-1983, when the Court controlled its docket, but did not make
any rulings based on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; 1984-1990, the initial
Charter period; and two later Charter periods, 1991-1999 and 2000-2003.'
Songer incorporates his statistics, interview data, and the work of a selection of
authors into a lucid analysis of how the justices are selected, and why and how
they reach their decisions.
Songer begins, in chapter one, by contrasting a Court that was largely ig-
nored in the early 1970s to one that now generates extensive media coverage and
political debate. The Supreme Court's transformation from obscurity to the
pinnacle of power as the interpreter of the Charter means that the Court now
has both legal and political roles.
In chapter two, Songer elaborates on his argument that the Canadian high
court is more democratic than final courts in other jurisdictions, due to the diver-
sity of the backgrounds of its justices. He notes that the Canadian Constitution's
geographical requirements effectively demand the appointment of Catholics,
Protestants, Francophones, and Anglophones.' Justices, including those now
serving, have been appointed by both Liberal and Conservative prime ministers.
Songer also traces the evolution of a once completely male bench to one that
now boasts four women. In addition, the Court now has members representing
a variety of faiths. Songer mentions, however, that many justices had no prior
judicial experience before being elevated to the Court. While Songer is correct
in noting that the background of the Court's justices has become more diverse,
especially in respect to gender, in labelling this trend "democratic," he fails to
come to grips with the fact that all of the justices are white, upper-middle class,
and, perhaps most importantly, one-time lawyers.
4. Some issues are tracked on an annual basis, while others are matched with the terms of the
Court's Chief Justices.
5. Songer, supra note I at 26-42.
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Chapter three begins by describing the Court's control of its docket-almost
all cases today require the Court's leave before they will be heard.6 In discussing
which issues receive this leave, Songer quotes the justices as concluding that
"national importance is the key [criterion as to whether leave is granted]." The
Court is not interested in error correction, but rather in issues of legal signifi-
cance. Songer then traces three major trends in the Court's docket: firstly, and
especially since the advent of the Charter, the Court has heard more criminal
cases as compared to those involving private economic disputes; secondly, the
number of statutory interpretation cases dipped below those involving constitu-
tional issues in the wake of the Charter, but have now rebounded; and, thirdly,
the number of cases involving judicial review in general, as opposed to those
involving only the review of statutes, rose after the Charter was enacted.
Songer next turns his attention toward the various players in the judicial
system, and, specifically, who wins and who loses. He finds that corporations
are just as likely to be the appellant as they are to be the respondent, while indi-
viduals are more likely to be the appellant! The provincial level of government
appears most often in front of the Supreme Court of Canada, but, as a function
of population, Ontario is underrepresented before the Court, while British
Columbia is overrepresented.8 Individuals have the lowest success rate (41 per
cent), while the provincial and federal governments have the highest (62 per
cent); however, the party-capability theory, which predicts a higher success rate
for litigants who possess greater resources, is contradicted by the success rate of
individuals over businesses.9
In chapter five, Transformation moves towards a discussion of the Court's
decision-making process. There has been a trend towards more appeals being
heard by all nine justices, and, in all time periods, the number of justices hearing
a case increased with the importance of the issues involved. Additionally, the au-
thor finds that non-party intervenors are playing an increasing role.1" The me-
chanics of the justices' preparation, hearing, consensus-building, and opinion
writing are discussed with an informative blending of previous commentary with
Songer's own interview data. While there does not appear to be a clear rule for
6. Some criminal cases continue to come before the Court as of right.
7. Songer, supra note 1 at 83.
8. Ibid. at 85.
9. Ibid. at 93.
10. Ibid. at 123-26.
606 (2009] 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
determining who will author the opinion of the Court, seniority, expertise, indi-
vidual interest, present workload, and the Chief Justice's vague perception of who
can best unite the bench are governing factors." Some justices have their clerks
draft the initial opinion, while others write the first draft and then request cri-
tique from their clerks. The draft majority opinion is then circulated to the other
justices for comment. Negotiation often ensues as to the basis for the opinion, and
these discussions sometimes lead to redrafting with a view to broaden support.
Transformation is at its strongest when it analyzes the extent to which the
Court's decision making is legal or judicial and the extent to which it is chang-
ing. In chapters six through eight, extant attitudinal studies, which propose that
justices make rulings based on their personal opinions as opposed to the law,
are efficaciously interwoven with the information gathered from Songer's inter-
views. This results in an analysis that cogently supports Songer's thesis that,
while the Canadian justices' attitudes are important to their decision-making
process, most of their efforts are spent analyzing legal issues as opposed to
policy-based materials.
Songer's thesis is supported by his examination of the justices' collegial
approach to the decision-making process, with an emphasis on compromise
and unanimity in forming opinions. While there is, on occasion, bargaining
among the judges regarding an opinion, in an attempt to obtain wider support
for the ruling, there did not appear in Songer's study to be any trading of votes
from case to case.12 However, the fact that the attitudes and background charac-
teristics of the justices-including the gender and political party that appointed
the justice in question-appear to be correlated to the directionality of their
decisions shows that factors other than an objective legal analysis also play a role
in the outcomes reached by the Court. 3 Given this information, though, the
role that the justices' attitudes play in the Court's decision-making process is
small, and substantially controlled by the political moderation of the judicial
system and the justices' strong respect for the rule of law.
There were several specific conclusions reached by the author. Firstly, the
interviews disclose that the justices strive for consistency in their rulings across
the provinces." Secondly, while the Court has been moderately conservative
11. Ibid. at 129.
12. Ibid. at 216-17, 235-36.
13. Ibid. at 223-28, 235.
14. Ibid. at 156.
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overall and particularly in criminal law matters, it has been more liberal in deci-
sions dealing with civil liberties, public law, and torts. Thirdly, the advent of
the Charter led to more liberal decisions in the criminal sphere and increased
the Court's progressive tendencies in the civil liberties cases. Fourthly, when the
Charter was first enacted, rights claimants had a high rate of success (66 per
cent), but their success rate has declined in recent years (40 per cent)." Lastly,
there is a high proportion of unanimous decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court of Canada (approximately 70%), especially when compared to the US
Supreme Court (approximately 35%).6
CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE: INTERVIEWS AND SYNTHESIS
The most important additions to our knowledge of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada are the interviews conducted with the Court's justices. Songer inserts the in-
terviews throughout his narrative, effectively peering inside the leave-to-appeal
decision-making processes of the Court, as well as the collegiality-enhancing
practices of the justices. The questions posed to the Justices are included in the
Appendix; however, the transcripts of the interviews are not included. Portions
of the interviews are summarized throughout the text, as the justices' responses
become relevant to the points that Songer seeks to make.
In two sections, Songer tackles Charles Epp's contention that the Charter's
influence on the Court's jurisprudence "is overrated."17 Songer begins by con-
trasting Epp's opinion with those of other scholars and then moves on to criticize
Epp's methodological choice of measuring trends by examining the Court's
decisions every five years. Songer expanded his quantitative analysis to include
holdings from every year. His larger sample allows him to conclude that there
was a substantial increase in the percentage of civil rights cases on the .Court's
docket after the enactment of the Charter.18 Furthermore, the success rate for
those seeking a civil rights remedy increased post-Charter.19
Notwithstanding that Songer's text contains several important contributions
to legal scholarship, Transformation contains several notable gaps. Although it
15. Ibid. at 161-72.
16. Ibid. at 210-13.
17. Ibid. at 70-76, 166-72. However, Songer makes no reference to Harry Arthurs & Brent
Arnold, "Does the Charter Matter?" (2005) 11 Rev. .Const. Stud. 37.
18. Songer, ibid. at 164-65.
19. Ibid. at 168.
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bears a 2008 publishing date, most of the research pre-dates 2004.2' Where later
texts are referred to, including Ostberg and Wetstein's highly relevant 2007
book on attitudinal decision-making,21 the reference is cursory at best, and the
findings are not incorporated into the author's analysis.2 2 Songer's conclusion 23
that the justices are unwilling to use section 7 of the Charter to depart from the
status quo is radically at odds with the Court's 2005 decision in Chaoulli, which
utilized section 7 to remove prohibitions on private health care.26
The most striking omission for a largely empirical text is the lack of reference
to a series of articles that measured the extent to which the Court strikes down
legislation for contravening the Charter. In 2003, Choudhry and Hunter con-
cluded that the rate at which legislation was being struck down by the Court was
neither increasing nor decreasing over time, and that the Court's rulings under
section 1 of the Charter did not show any consistent pattern over time.25 Their
2003 piece was an update of articles by several eminent authors published in 1992
and 1999.26 This statistical analysis is directly relevant to Songer's discussion on
the extent to which legislation was, or was not, struck down.27
20. For example, Songer entirely omits reference to my text, which is published by Songer's own
publisher. See Daved Muttart, The Empirical Gap in Jurisprudence: A Comprehensive Study of
the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
21. Cynthia L. Ostberg & Matthew E. Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme
Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
22. Songer, supra note 1 at 194.
23. Ibid. at 171.
24. Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791. Only four of the five justices in the majority used
section 7, but the door is now certainly wide open to further expansive use of section 7.
25. Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, "Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of
Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE' (2003) 48 McGill L.J.
525. See also Daved Muttart, "Dodging The Issue: Activism in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2005) 54 U.N.B.L.J. 101 (where the first finding was confirmed, but the second
one was contradicted).
26. F.L. Morton, Peter H. Russell & Michael J. Withey, "The Supreme Court's First One
Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1;
James B. Kelly, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Rebalancing of Liberal
Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625. Songer does
briefly quote the 1992 article-misspelling the name of one of the authors-but goes no
further. See Songer, supra note 1 at 161. These articles also demonstrate that the Court does
not deal differentially with issues covered by the section 33 notwithstanding clause, a point
that is not discussed in Transformation.
27. Songer, ibid. at 159-72.
BOOK REVIEWS 609
Songer is also uneven in his treatment of other relevant scholarship. He cites
H.L.A. Hart's legal positivism but does not mention Ronald Dworkin's contrary
analysis. He quotes Michael Mandel's legalization hypothesis, while omitting
Allan Hutchinson's rebuttal.28 The Court's insistence on the accused person's
right to a trial within a reasonable timeframe in R. v. Askov (1990) is cited, but
not its speedy retreat in R. v. Morin (1992).29 Songer fails to mention published
accounts by the justices themselves of the decision-making process in the Court.3"
While Transformation provides some comparison between the Canadian and
American Supreme Courts,3 I would have appreciated a more in-depth com-
parison, given that Songer is American. The discussion of attitudinal decision-
making studies in Canada and the United States32 is a welcome exception, but,
even here, the description of the situation in the United States tends to be
general: there are no charts of pro-accused, pro-underdog, or pro-government
rulings by American justices to match those of their Canadian counterparts.
Comparisons with other courts of last resort are even more cursory.
Transformation would perhaps, therefore, have been strengthened by col-
laboration with a Canadian author. For example, the rise in the proportion of
criminal and civil rights appeals33 was influenced by resources available through
legal aid and other court-funding programs. A Canadian author would pre-
sumably have encouraged Songer to take this issue into account.
Lastly, Songer's discussion as to the methodology that he employed is often
cursory. For example, there is a lack of justification as to how cases were chosen
or coded.3" Such descriptions are essential for scientific replication. Also, it is
28. Allan C. Hutchinson, Waitingfor Coraf A Critique ofLaw and Rights (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1995).
29. R. v. Askov, 11990] 2 S.C.R. 1199; R. v. Morin, 119921 1 S.C.R. 771. See Sanger, supra note
1 at 144.
30. See e.g. Ian Binnie, "A Survivor's Guide to Advocacy in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1999)
18 Advocates Soc. J. 13; Beverley M. McLachlin, "The Charter. A New Role for the Judiciary"
(1991) 29 Alta L. Rev. 540; John Sopinka, "Must a Judge be a Monk-Revisited" (1996) 45
U.N.B.L.J. 167; Michel Bastarache, "The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial
Decision-Making" (1999) 37 Alta L. Rev. 739; and John C. Major, "Unconscious Parallelism:
Constitutional Law in Canada and the United States" (2005) 19 Wash U.J.L. & Pol'y 139.
31. See e.g. Songer, supra note 1 at 56, 69-70.
32. Ibid. at 173-94.
33. Ibid. at 60, 70.
34. Ibid. at 67. The discussion of winners and losers is a happy exception (at 90ff).
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often unclear whether the author is relying on previous sources or his interviews
when discussing the Court's practices or decision-making processes.35
In summary, Transformation has several gaps in its argument. However, the
interviews granted by the justices are interesting and illuminating, and unlikely
to be found elsewhere. The analysis of the extent to which the Court's rulings are
judicial, as opposed to political, is lucid, coherent, and enlightening.
35. See e.g. ibid. at 121, 132-33.
